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Abstract
Non-contributory social pension has been widely used to provide minimum income
support for disadvantaged seniors. Despite its efficacy in reducing old-age poverty, only
a few studies systematically assessed whether the benefits of social pension extend to
health outcomes. In this paper, we exploit a reform to the South Korean social pension
in 2014 to provide evidence on the health effects of expanding social pension. Using
data from the Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging, we estimate a series of difference-
in-differences models that compare changes in health of individuals age-eligible for the
social pension (age ≥ 65) to those younger than the minimum qualification age (age
< 65), before and after the reform in 2014. The estimates show an average of 8.1-
9.0% reductions in the count of depressive symptoms attributable to the reform. We
also find that the mental health benefit comes primarily from beneficiaries being more
satisfied with their financial condition and overall quality of life. However, despite the
large increase in income there were no significant improvements in grip strength and
self-rated health. Overall, this study highlights the importance of social pension as a
means of protecting mental health of disadvantaged seniors.
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1 Introduction
Social Security systems in the U.S. and many other high-income countries have built
upon a contributory scheme in which a fixed proportion of the labor income is taxed to
support the system. In countries where the labor market informality is high, however, a
traditional pay-as-you-go pension could not fully scale-up and left a large proportion of
the population without pension coverage (van Ginneken, 1999). In response, a growing
number of countries have introduced social pension or supplementary income support. Social
pension is a government-provided cash transfer in which access to benefits does not require a
contributory record. The provision/expansion of social pension has proved to be an efficient
way to alleviate the depth of poverty as well as its incidence among older persons (Barrientos
and Lloyd-Sherlock, 2002; Deaton and Case, 1998; Kaushal, 2014).
An important, yet underexplored, hypothesis is whether more generous social pension
program leads to better health. From a public health perspective, the provision of pension
income can enable the poor to avoid exposure to harmful environments and adopt practices
beneficial to health (Phelan et al., 2010). For instance, beneficiaries would be able to use
pension income to move to a safer or cleaner living environment, upgrade household facil-
ities for better sanitation, or consume nutritious meals that they need to maintain good
health (Case, 2004). For those who have forgone medical care due to cost-related reasons,
additional cash benefit would afford an opportunity whereby the desired level of healthcare
consumption can be achieved (Lloyd-Sherlock and Agrawal, 2014). Moreover, increases in
non-labor income promote a transition into retirement, which allows individuals to move
away from hazardous and stressful working environments. The argument that retirement
improves health is particularly relevant to low-income workers who were engaging in risky
and heavy physical work before retirement (Kuhn, 2018).
While the positive impact pension support has on health seems theoretically validated,
the magnitude of the effect is contingent on a number of potentially offsetting factors. The
first is the extent to which additional pension income increases the consumption of un-
healthy goods (e.g., alcohol, candies, drugs, and tobacco). Social pension is primarily the
income support program in which benefits can be spent on any goods, including essential
and non-essential ones. Under the plausible assumption that income elasticity with respect
to unhealthy goods is positive, cash transfer through social pension could promote unhealthy
behaviors and partially offset the health benefits realized through the channels mentioned
above.
A negative social image associated with government support is another pathway that
could contract beneficiaries’ health and well-being (Stuber and Schlesinger, 2006). Social
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stereotype tends to discriminate against people on government support, labeling them a
failure, lazy, and burden to society (Krause, 1996). A link between government support
and emotional discomfort among beneficiaries has been well reported in psychiatric research
(Dooley and Prause, 2002; Qi and Wu, 2018).
Empirical studies regarding health-social pension correlation have yielded mixed results.
Of the slim evidence to date, pension income was found to have a positive influence on self-
rated health in households’ pooling income (Case, 2004) or to reduce depressive symptoms
among poor rural populations (Galiani et al., 2016; Salinas-Rodr´ıguez et al., 2014). In China,
pension provision to rural residents improved physical health but had no discernible impact
on self-rated health and psychological well-being (Cheng et al., 2018). Evidence from Colom-
bia (Hessel et al., 2018) showed a positive association between cash transfer and self-rated
health in disadvantaged older men, but not in women. A randomized experimental study
by Aguila et al. (2015) demonstrated that a significant portion of income supplement was
spent on doctor visits and medications, leading to improvements in lung function, memory,
and hemoglobin levels of beneficiaries. Despite some evidence of health benefits, findings
from this line of research vastly differ in terms of health outcomes and the characteristics of
beneficiaries examined.
This study delves into the social pension expansion in South Korea (Korea, hereafter) and
its impact on population health. One of the major social problems for Korea has been a large
number of seniors entering retirement without pension income, contributing to the highest
rate of elderly poverty among OECD countries. To address this issue, the Korean government
introduced a social pension scheme in 2008. This program was further expanded in July
2014 in an attempt to provide monthly benefits that are large enough to mitigate elderly
poverty, particularly for the generation not covered by the compulsory national pension. In
this paper, we study the spillover effects of the 2014 social pension expansion on health of
beneficiaries. We conduct a series of difference-in-differences analysis that compares pre-
vs. post-expansion changes in health outcomes of the eligible group relative to the non-
eligible group. The 2014 expansion presents a unique opportunity to isolate the causal effect
of social pension because the potential beneficiary group was changed unexpectedly as the
reform was implemented. This setting enables us to minimize the confounding effect of
voluntary consumption changes in anticipation that income will rise permanently.
Results showed that the 2014 expansion of the Korean social pension was associated with
significant reductions in the count of depressive symptoms and the prevalence of clinical
depression, holding other covariates constant. It also suggested that increased satisfaction
with financial condition and overall quality of life is the primary mechanism the reform has
produced mental health benefits. Other pathways, such as retirement, changes in health
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behavior, and increased access to healthcare, were found to have a limited mediating role.
Furthermore, there was no evidence that other health domains, with regard to measures of
grip strength and self-rated health, were improved in response to the reform. Our findings
indicate significant mental health benefits and a likely decline in suicide among disadvantaged
seniors, given a close link between depression and suicidal behaviors among poor elders in
Korea.
This study makes several contributions to the literature on the health effect of social
pension. First, we demonstrate improvements in mental health resulting from a declining
prevalence of major depression. Our analyses below show that the estimated pension effect
is not merely picking up a transient mood change but also capture a meaningful reduction in
clinical depression, which will have an important implication for mortality benefits. Second,
we provide evidence for the health effect of social pension in a relatively well-developed
country. Currently, most existing evidence in this strand of research has been reported
from developing countries in which health benefit of cash transfer is likely to arise from
curing disease associated with poverty and insanitation (e.g., infectious and communicable
disease). In our study, we look into the case of a developed economy where people are
more likely to suffer from relative poverty and die with “diseases of affluence” like cancer
and suicide. Third, our analyses demonstrate an alternative pathway through which social
pension expansion could yield health benefits, namely a subjective well-being channel. This
finding complements the existing evidence of health gains through increased access to health
care and nutrition reported in developing countries (Aguila et al., 2018).
2 Background
2.1 Basic Old-Age Pension in South Korea
The National Pension Scheme (NPS) is the primary social security program in Korea.
It was launched in January 1988 and provided compulsory coverage to regular employees
in workplaces with ten or more employees. The program has been gradually expanded
to include all workplaces and became the universal pension for the general public in 2006
(Lee and Lee, 2009). Although participation has been mandated by law since 1999, a large
number of self-employed and non-regular workers were exempted. Therefore, the share of
NPS contributors in working-age populations has remained below 50% since its inception
(Jones and Urasawa, 2014).
Beginning in January 2008, the Korean government introduced a means-tested income
support program for the elderly, the Basic Old-Age Pension (BOAP). It is a tax-funded social
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pension that transfers flat-rate cash benefits to qualified individuals. Pension benefits are
means-tested based on the applicant’s age and recognized household income (income plus
income-equivalent wealth).1 Eligibility is granted to those aged 65 or higher whose recognized
household income is in the bottom 70% of the distribution. The maximum benefit was set
at 5% of the average monthly pension income earned by NPS participants for three years
before implementing the program. In 2008, beneficiaries could receive a maximum of 84
thousand KRW (✩78) per month if single and 139 thousand KRW (✩129) if married.2 The
total number of beneficiaries increased to 3.7 million in 2010 and 4.9 million in 2014 — about
67–68% of the age-eligible population (Lee and Wolf, 2014).
As of July 2014, the BOAP was replaced by the Basic Pension (BP). This reform was
originated from a former president Park’s electoral pledge to provide a new pension program
that pays out 200 thousand KRW (✩186) every month to all seniors aged 65 or higher. Once
elected, the Park’s administration executed this pledge in the form of doubling monthly
allowances from the BOAP and re-naming the program into the BP. However, amid criticisms
that the BP will be insolvent within a few decades, the government re-instated the income
testing rule and limited coverages to the poorest 70% of the age-eligible seniors. Under the
BP scheme, beneficiaries could collect up to 10% of the average pension benefits from the
NPS, which is equivalent to 168 thousand KRW (✩156) for singles and 269 thousand KRW
(✩250) for married couples.
The introduction of the BP included a clause to consider benefits from public transfer
programs when calculating recognized income. That is, under the BP monthly benefit was
reduced by the amount of transfer income from other social welfare programs or contributory
pension. For an unmarried person entitled to National Basic Livelihood Security (NBLS),
for instance, the expected maximum benefit from the BP was 168 thousand KRW minus
benefits from the NBLS. Despite these rules, doubling maximum benefits was a significant
improvement over the previous scheme for those without a source of fixed income stream.
Empirical research into the effect of BOAP on economic security has provided mixed re-
sults. Some studies found that poverty headcount and poverty gap were lower for households
with basic pension beneficiaries (Lee and Moon, 2014), or that beneficiaries were more likely
to avoid the poverty trap (Kang and Choi, 2010). In contrast, others found that disposable
income and consumption expenditures did not increase much for beneficiaries (Lee and Jang,
2015), or that improvement in financial well-being in response to the BOAP was small in
1The recognized household income is current income plus annuity value of net worth, which is determined
by the formula: (0.7 × (monthly labor income – 84 thousand KRW)) + miscellaneous income + (0.04 ×
net assets). In 2010, for instance, the maximum recognized income to qualify for the BP was 700 thousand
KRW for singles and 1120 thousand KRW for married couples.
2As of June 9th, 2018, a thousand KRW is equivalent to ✩0.931.
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magnitude (Lee and Kwon, 2016; Shin and Do, 2015). Moreover, studies have disagreed as
to whether the BOAP reduced labor supply and to what extent replaced private transfer
from adult children to parents. Lee et al. (2019) found no changes in labor income and
private transfer income after the 2014 reform, while Lee and Lee (2009) found a moderate
correlation between the BOAP and private transfer among middle-income families.
Prior literature attributed this mixed evidence to the small amount of monthly benefits.
However, given a low coverage of contributory pension and the high rate of old-age poverty in
Korea, it is difficult to imagine that a new source of pension income has created little welfare
benefits. A plausible explanation for the limited efficacy of the BOAP is the confounding
effect of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The fact that the program was implemented near
the peak of the 2007–2008 financial crisis raises the possibility that the recession may have
affected poor seniors to a greater extent and through this pathway partially offset the corre-
lation between the BOAP and beneficiaries’ financial condition. Indeed, recent research on
the 2014 reform demonstrated a declining poverty gap and a significant rise in consumption
expenditures and subjective well-being among those who benefited from the reform (Lee et
al., 2019; Pak, 2020a; 2020b). We extend this line of research by examining whether the
2014 reform had a spillover effect on health outcomes.
3 Research Design and Methods
3.1 Data description
The data are drawn from the 2008 to 2016 waves of the KLoSA, a biennial longitudinal
survey of individuals aged 45 or older and their spouses. The KLoSA provides informa-
tion on demographic characteristics, family structure, health and health behaviors, labor
market participation, and economic conditions that are critical to understanding living cir-
cumstances of older Korean persons. Interview has been administered in the second half
of every even year. In 2014, the survey was conducted between September and November
(after implementation of the BP reform).
The sample is restricted to individuals aged 55 to 74 years in 2014. Additionally, to avoid
the potentially confounding effects a cigarette tax increase in January 2015 we excluded
individuals who identified themselves as smoker in the 2014 survey. The final sample is an
unbalanced panel of 16,430 observations for 3792 individuals.3
3The estimation results in the following section are robust to the choice of age bands and keeping smokers
in the sample.
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3.2 Treatment and control group
The means-tested structure of social pension poses an empirical challenge for randomiz-
ing treatment assignment. Potential beneficiaries around the income or asset threshold have
an incentive to spend down their assets to qualify for cash support (Hubbard et al., 1995), as
demonstrated by a positive association between welfare eligibility and consumption expen-
ditures (Gruber and Yelowitz, 1999; Powers, 1998). If changes in wealth are endogenously
determined by a means test, enrollment status at the time of the BP reform cannot be used
as a treatment condition.
The alternative approach is to use the minimum qualification age (≥ 65) as a threshold
to become age-eligible for the BP (Koh and Yang, 2017).4 Under this identification strategy,
non-married respondents aged 65-74 and married couples where the eldest spouse is aged
65-74 get assigned to the treatment group, and non-married persons aged 55-64 and married
couples where both spouses are aged 55-64 form the control group. This approach identifies
“intent-to-treat” effect and yields a lower bound estimate of the policy effect.
3.3 Measures of physical and mental health
Self-rated health
Self-rated health is a global measure of health that captures a full range of possible
diseases and functional limitations (Idler and Benyamini, 1997). It is based on the survey
question, “How would you rate your health condition at present?”.5 Responses are scaled
from 1 to 5, with “very poor” health equal to 1 and “very good” health equal to 5. Close to
81.2% of the sample respondents rated their health condition fair or better.
Grip strength
Grip strength is known to indicate the risk of developing chronic diseases and mortality
in old age (Silventoinen et al., 2009). It is considered a better marker of frailty than chrono-
logical age (Syddall et al., 2003) and has been used as a proxy of general health conditions in
geriatric research (Christensen et al., 2001). The strength was measured using a hand-held
dynamometer; respondents were asked to squeeze a lever as hard as they can, and the mea-
surements were recorded in kilograms on a scale of 0 to 100. Of a total of four measurements
4The threshold age does not coincide with a full retirement age for the National Pension in South Korea
(equivalent to Social Security in the US), which had been 55 until December 2015 and increased to 60 from
January 2016. Adding an indicator of retirement age to regressions does not alter our inferences about the
pension effect.
5Survey questions are translated from Korean.
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for each respondent (two for each hand), the mean of the largest recorded value for each hand
was taken. This measure has advantages over self-rated health as its values are independent
of reporting style and are measured on a clearly defined scale (Decker and Schmitz, 2016).
Mental health
Mental health is measured by the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression (CES-
D) scale. The CES-D is a reliable measure of depression and anxiety, which shows high
correlations with clinical diagnoses (Turvey et al., 1999). The test is based on a series of
questions on negative feelings (having the blues, experiencing life as a failure, feeling lonely
or sad, crying), positive thoughts (being hopeful about the future, feeling happy, enjoying
life), somatic activities (losing appetite, suffering from a restless sleep, talking less), and
social contacts (experiencing other persons as unfriendly). The KLoSA uses CES-D10 and
yields a score of depression on a 0-30 scale.
Estimation strategy
The health effect of the BP is estimated by comparing changes in health outcomes of the
treatment groups and the control groups before and after the reform in 2014. We estimate
a linear difference-in-differences (DD) model in the following form,
yi,t = β0 + β1I(Agei,t ≥ 65) + β2Postt + β3I(Agei,t ≥ 65)× Postt +X
′
i,tΨ+ τt + εi,t (1)
, where i denotes individual respondent; t ∈ {2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016} indexes survey
years; εi,t is an error term; and β and Ψ are parameters to be estimated. The outcome
variable, yi,t, is one of the health indicators for person i at time t. I(Agei,t ≥ 65) is an
indicator of treatment group, and Postt is a dummy for observations from the 2014 and
2016 waves. τt denotes year-of-survey dummy, which accounts for heterogeneity in health
by time. The treatment effect of the BP reform is identified by β3 on the interaction term
between I(Agei,t ≥ 65) and Postt.
The covariate vectorXi,t includes age, age squared, gender, educational background, mar-
ital status, number of children, public health insurance ownership, national pension receipt,
social welfare receipt, household income, total net worth, cohort fixed effects, and month-
of-survey fixed effects. Education background is captured by binary variables for less than
middle school education and for high school or college education (less than elementary school
education forms the reference category). For marital status, we include dummies for married,
divorced or separated, and widowed (with never-married forming the reference group). We
also define a dummy for welfare benefit receipt, which takes on one for respondents receiv-
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ing benefits from unemployment compensation, industrial accident compensation, national
basic livelihood security program, Veterans benefits, and other social welfare programs (not
including the BP), and zero otherwise. Household income is the total amount of income re-
ceived by both spouses in the year preceding the survey, not including benefits from the BP
and social welfare programs. Total net worth is defined as the sum of checking and savings
accounts, bonds, stocks, private savings, personal lending to others, vehicles, housing, real es-
tate, business, and other financial assets minus short-term debts and mortgages. Household
income is transformed by log(x+1), and total net worth is transformed by the log-modulus
function (John and Draper, 1980).6 Cohort fixed effects are captured by dummies for the
year of birth (1931-40; 1941-50; 1951-60; 1961+).
Regression equations are estimated by pooled ordinary least squares (OLS). It has ad-
vantages over the individual fixed effects (FE) model in that it captures changes in health
of persons who aged from 64 to 65 during the reform (2012 to 2014), as well as those who
were already older than age 65 when the BP was expanded. In our sample, about 90% of
respondents in the treatment group were aged 65 or higher in 2012, and only less than 10%
turned the threshold age at the time of the reform. The individual FE model is limited in
that it does not reflect improvements in health among those who were already collecting
benefits from the BP prior to the reform and leads to a significantly underestimated policy
effect.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual and age levels to account for non-
independence of errors within person × age groups. As the levels at which standard errors
should be clustered are not clear, we present regression results with alternative standard
errors clustered at the combination of individual, household, age, year, and sampling stra-
tum levels (Table A1). The standard error estimates vary across specifications but leave the
inference of the BP effect unchanged.
A key identifying assumption is that there is no discrepancy in the underlying trend
in health outcomes unrelated to the BP expansion. That is, changes in health should be
reasonably similar for the treatment and control groups in the absence of the BP effect. A
formal test of parallel trends is to examine the joint significance of interaction terms between
the treatment condition and year dummies in the pre-expansion periods. The following
regression is used to implement this test.
yi,t = γ0 + γ1I(Agei,t ≥ 65) +
2016∑
t=2008
γ2,t · τt +
2016∑
t=2008
γ3,tI(Agei,t ≥ 65) · τt +X
′
i,tΦ + εi,t (2)
6The formula for log-modulus transformation is, sign(x)× log(|x|+1). This transformation applies stan-
dard logarithmic transformation to negative values while preserving the location of zero. The interpretation
of marginal effects remains the same.
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The null hypothesis is that there is no underlying trend differential in health between the
two groups before the BP expansion (H0 : γ3,2008 = γ3,2010 = 0). If the null hypothesis is
rejected, the study would conclude that unobserved factors drove a trend break in health,
and a different identification strategy should be sought.
The weakness of age-based identification is that the treatment group includes both en-
rollees and non-enrollees aged 65 or higher. Since the average treatment effect is dispersed
across non-enrollees (about 30% of the treated subjects), the estimate of β3 in eq. (1) un-
derstates changes in health due to the BP expansion. To account for this downward bias,
we estimate the instrumental variable (IV) model of the following form.
yi,t = δ0 + δ1 ̂TrInci,t + δ2I(Agei,t ≥ 65) + δ3Posti,t +X
′
i,tΩ + τt + εi,t (3)
, where TrInc is a log of monthly average household income from government cash transfer
programs (unemployment compensation, industrial accident compensation, national basic
livelihood security program, Veterans benefits, basic pension, and other social welfare pro-
grams) for a year preceding the survey. The first stage regression is based on the main
DD specification in eq. (1), which uses the interaction term I(Agei,t ≥ 65) × Postt as an
instrument. The predicted value from the first stage regression T̂ rInc captures variation in
TrInc explained by the BP expansion and other control variables. The parameter of interest
δ1 shows the effect of the BP expansion on health only indirectly through changes in public
transfer income. As TrInc would have not changed for those not enrolled in the BP, the
estimate of δ1 gives us net changes in health only for persons who have benefited from the BP
expansion (i.e., local average treatment effect). A similar approach was used in the research
of health insurance reform (Engelhardt and Gruber, 2011).
4 Results
Table 1 presents summary statistics by experimental conditions. On average, respondents
were 61.9 years old; females made up 60% of the sample; 85% were married; and 44% were
full-time employees. The average household earned 32,500 thousand KRW (✩30,258) a year
and accumulated 237,787 thousand KRW of net worth (✩221,380). Examining the pre-post
changes in health outcomes, we find that the CES-D score has fallen more significantly for
the age-eligible group than for the age-ineligible group. Other health measures exhibit no
significant differences by the reform across the two age groups.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
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Table 2 presents OLS estimation results for the DD models. For brevity, coefficient
estimates for the fixed effects are omitted from the table. The results in columns 1 and 2
show no significant association between BP and health outcomes. The coefficients on the
interaction term are small in magnitude and estimated with large standard errors, leading
to no rejection of the null hypothesis. The coefficient on the interaction term in column 3
indicates that the BP expansion is associated with an average of 0.500 points decline in a
mean CES-D among the age-eligible persons relative to those age-ineligible. This decline is
statistically significant at the 1% level and corresponds to an 8.1% decline (= −0.500/6.18)
from its pre-2014 mean.7
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Table 3 presents coefficient estimates for eq. (2) with 2012 as a reference year. Across all
three columns, the coefficient estimates on the interaction term for the years 2008 and 2010
are not significant at the 5% level (estimate of γ3,2008 and γ3,2010). The joint significance tests
in the bottom panel also show no rejection of the null hypothesis that γ3,2008 and γ3,2010 are
jointly equal to zero (H0 : γ3,2008 = γ3,2010 = 0). Combined, there is not enough evidence to
reject the assumption of parallel trends in the absence of the BP expansion. Beginning in
2014, however, there is a clear trend break in the CES-D that had sustained through 2016
(column 3). The estimate of γ3,2014 shows that, in the first year of expansion, the difference
in the CES-D score between the age-eligible and age-ineligible groups is 0.333 units lower
compared to a corresponding difference in year 2012. Evaluated at the pre-2014 mean of
the CES-D, this estimate represents a 5.4% reduction in the count of depressive symptoms
(= −0.333/6.18). The estimate of γ3,2016 shows 0.831 units decline (or 13.4%) in the CES-D
between 2012 and 2016 among the age-eligible group relative to the age-ineligible group.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Fig. 1 plots coefficient estimates from Table 3. The figures on the left plot coefficient
estimate on the interaction terms (solid lines) and associated 95% confidence intervals (cir-
cles). Each point on the solid line represents difference in health between age-eligible and
age-ineligible groups for each year relative to 2012. The figures on the right plot trends in
health using estimates on year fixed effects and interaction terms. The first two sets of figures
(grip strength and self-rated health) have relatively wide confidence intervals that include
both positive and negative values and show no evidence of trend differential after the reform.
The figures for the CES-D score highlight a clear trend break in 2014 and an accelerated
7The inference regarding the BP effect is robust to re-weighting regressions using the propensity score.
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decline in the CES-D for the age-eligible group. All figures show plausibly parallel trends in
health in the pre-expansion periods.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The DD model rests on the assumption that unobserved factors unrelated to the BP
reform are not driving trend differentials in health between the treatment and control groups.
It may be of concern that unobserved policy change or macroeconomic shock occurred during
or after the reform exerted differential influence on the experimental groups and contributed
to a trend break in the post periods. To evaluate this possibility, we expand our DD regression
with indicators of potential confounders (business cycle effect and individual/household-
level covariates that could be affected by other policy changes) and their interactions with
a treatment dummy. The additional interaction terms allow the potential confounders to
have differential effects on the treatment and control groups and help β3 isolate the BP’s net
effect.
We first present estimates from a regression with no covariates (column 1), and give base-
line regression results in the next column for reference (column 2). We then add interaction
terms involving a linear year variable and quadratic age effects to the baseline model (col-
umn 3). These interactions allow for differential linear and non-linear time trends in health
outcomes for the treatment group relative to the younger cohorts. Next, we include all co-
variates in column 3 plus quarterly unemployment rate for individuals aged 55 to 64 (column
4). Unemployment rates are obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data at the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis and match-merged with the primary data according to survey
dates. Lastly, we include all covariates in column 4 plus interactions between I(Agei,t ≥ 65)
and marital status, national pension receipt, social welfare receipt, public health insurance
ownership, household income, total net worth, and unemployment rate (column 5). The
estimates reported in the table are coefficient estimates on the interaction term, conditioned
on the baseline covariates and interaction terms.
Across all columns, the correlations between the BP expansion and the CES-D are nega-
tive and different from zero at the 5% level. The estimated coefficients vary to some degree
but carry the same inference regarding the effect of the BP expansion on the CES-D. The
back-of-the-envelope calculation relative to the pre-2014 mean of the CES-D ranges from -
5.9% (column 4) to -8.1% (column 2). The coefficient estimates from the regressions of other
health outcomes are not consistently significant across specifications. Overall, we find no
evidence that unobserved factors have affected the treatment and control groups differently
and confounded our estimates of the BP effect in the previous analyses.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
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Next, we estimate the local average treatment effect of the BP expansion (Table 5).
Column 1 presents estimates from the first stage regression, and the next three columns
present second stage regression for health outcomes. Regressions control for a full set of
covariates plus their interactions with a treatment dummy (as column 5 of Table 4). The
first stage estimates show that the BP expansion is associated with an average of 103%
increase (= exp(0.710)− 1) in public transfer income among age-eligible persons relative to
age-ineligible persons. The second stage estimates exhibit a 0.00542 reduction in the CES-
D for a 1% increase in public transfer income through the expansion of the BP (column
4). A rough calculation using these estimates gives us a 0.558 point decrease in the CES-
D score (= 0.00542 × 103) attributable to the BP expansion, or a 9.0% decline from the
pre-2014 mean of the CES-D (= −0.558/6.18). This estimate is about 1.45 times larger
(= −0.558/ − 0.384) than the corresponding interaction effect reported in Table 4 (column
5), confirming the prediction that age-based identification understates the policy effect by
the size of unaffected individuals in the treatment group. Other health outcomes remain
uncorrelated with the predicted public transfer income at the 5% level. The validity checks
of the IV model reject the null hypothesis of underidentification and weak identification by
a large margin.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Lastly, we explore potential mechanisms through which pension expansion reduces de-
pressive symptoms (Table 6). The potential mediators examined include indicators of full-
time employment, regular exercise, private health insurance ownership, out-of-pocket (OOP)
expenditures for medical services, number of medical service use, subjective well-being (fi-
nancial satisfaction and life satisfaction), food expenditures, and leisure expenditures (Table
A2). We estimate a series of regressions that augment with these variables and examine
changes in correlation between the BP reform and the CES-D score. If the BP expansion
affected mental health indirectly through a particular pathway, controlling for an indicator
of such would significantly attenuate the coefficient on the interaction term.
We present two sets of results: regressions in panel A test for the indirect effect through
non-consumption variables, and regressions in panel B test for the indirect effect through
consumption variables. The challenge of handling consumption variables in the KLoSA
is that these variables capture household spending between interviews or during the year
preceding the interview. As the BP effect through these consumption channels, if any, would
affect mental health of the next period, regressions should model the CES-D at t + 1 as a
function of the mediator variables measured at t + 1 and control variables at t. Therefore,
this specification uses a smaller sample of 12,054 observations from the 2008–2014 surveys.
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We find that the coefficients on the interaction term are significantly attenuated and be-
come statistically insignificant at the 5% level, conditional on subjective well-being (column
5). Other columns show the interaction effects in comparable magnitude with a high t-value
(p < 0.05). This analysis, along with the supplementary regression results in Table A3,
provides suggestive evidence that an increase in subjective well-being is a primary pathway
the BP expansion led to fewer depressive symptoms among beneficiaries. Table A4 presents
estimates from regressions of the binary indicator of clinical depression (CES-D ≥ 12). It
shows similar results in terms of the indirect impact of the BP expansion on mental health
mediated through the subjective well-being channel.8 These additional analyses suggest that
our baseline estimates are not merely picking up transient changes in depressive mood but
do represent clinically meaningful improvements in mental health.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Table 7 provides the regressions of the CES-D separately for various subsamples based
on the 2012 characteristics of the respondents. The first two columns examine heterogeneity
by household income and net worth, and the next three columns explore differences by
gender, labor supply, and social welfare receipt. We find that the effect of the BP reform
is more pronounced for females, full-time employees, and those with household income or
net worth being less than the sample mean (columns 1-4). Splitting the sample by social
welfare receipt confirms that the BP reform had no discernible influence on social welfare
beneficiaries (column 5). This is consistent with the structure of the reform to transfer
reduced benefits to those who were receiving supplementary income from other government
programs. Overall, we see that the benefits of the BP reform accrue mostly to relatively
disadvantaged households.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
5 Conclusion
This study examined the impact of social pension expansion on health. There are three
main findings. First, we found robust evidence that the 2014 expansion of the BP was asso-
ciated with improvements in mental health of beneficiaries. Our results showed an average
of 8.1-9.0% reduction in the count of depressive symptoms attributable to the reform, which
is in part driven by a declining prevalence of clinical depression. Second, we found sugges-
tive evidence that improved financial satisfaction is a major pathway through which the BP
8The cut-off of 12 has been validated as a threshold for screening clinical depression among older Koreans
using the CES-D10 (French et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2017).
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expansion produces mental health benefits. The correlations between the BP expansion and
mental health became insignificant when the regressions augment with measures of financial
satisfaction and life satisfaction. Third, we found no significant changes in grip strength and
self-rated health. The effects of the BP on grip strength and self-rated health were generally
small and not robust to alternative specifications.
It is worth noting that the mental health benefits show no evidence of fading over the time
horizon for which data are available. This pattern is in contrast to the hedonic adaptation
hypothesis, which suggests that the joy of economic gains gradually fades as people adapt to
circumstantial changes (Frederick and Lowenstein, 1999). This might be related to the fact
that the 2014 expansion of the BP was followed by a signal for additional benefit increase in
the coming years. Around the time the BP was expanded, a policy direction has been set to
address the problem of old-age poverty through further strengthening of non-contributory
pension and social welfare programs. The reform may have incurred expectations about an
additional future income from the BP, and through this expected income effect it could have
compensated for declining psychological benefits over time.
An alternative explanation from a behavioral perspective is that beneficiaries would not
have recognized additional cash benefits during the first few months as a permanent increase
in lifetime income. The expectation that more pension will be earned during the rest of the
life would be established only after beneficiaries notice an increased benefit coming repeatedly
for several months. It would take a few checks to be received in order for beneficiaries to
correctly perceive an increase in permanent income and to benefit from its psychological
effect.
Our finding of no improvements in physical health (grip strength and self-rated health)
could be related to the small amount of benefits from the BP. While Korea achieved a
universal healthcare system, beneficiaries still bear high out-of-pocket expenses and often
delay or forgo needed medical services over the concerns of catastrophic medical expenses
(Ruger and Kim, 2007). Avoidance of healthcare due to cost-related reasons is particularly
prevalent for those with multiple chronic conditions or those who need to undergo surgery
or rounds of expensive treatments for an extended period. Although doubling monthly
allowance was a significant improvement over its predecessor, the additional benefits from
the BP might not be large enough to fulfill unmet healthcare needs. Instead, beneficiaries
may have spent their pension on relatively affordable medical services, such as local clinic
visits and oriental medical services, which might be beneficial for quality of life but are
unlikely to improve physical strength or self-rated general health.
This study is subject to a number of limitations. First, our estimation results are subject
to attrition from a sample. A positive association between health and income raises the
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concern that poor and unhealthy individuals are under-represented in our study sample and
healthy individuals are over-represented. Under the plausible assumption that cash transfer
would induce a greater health benefit for low-income individuals, attrition from the sample
would lead to the underestimated BP effect. Second, the exclusion of smokers from the study
sample could have further attenuated our estimates. As a majority of smokers could have
been entitled to the BP, excluding them will omit significant health benefits among people at
the lower end of the health distribution. Third, our analysis captures relatively short-term
effect of the reform that arose during the first two years of implementation. Health is a
stock that accumulates over time, and any positive health shock will emerge gradually. If
a reduction in depressive symptoms is to have a positive spillover effect on physical health,
this mechanism may take longer to observe. Lastly, despite a series of robustness checks
the results are still subject to the confounding effect of concomitant policy changes that
may have occurred around the reform, which are not fully observed in our biennial data.
Our findings should be interpreted cautiously and put into a broader context of pension and
welfare reform in Korea around mid- and late-2010s.
Despite these limitations, our findings have important implications for population health
benefits of the social pension through suicide prevention. South Korea has an alarmingly high
rate of elderly suicide – the highest of the OECD countries, and many older persons commit
suicide due to the reasons related to financial hardship (Kwon et al., 2009). Given a strong
link between depression and suicidal ideation (Shin et al., 2013), it is plausible to argue that
the depression-reducing effect of pension support would have prevented premature death from
suicide and produced significant mortality benefits. In the literature, correlations between
non-contributory pension and improved mental health have been robust findings, reported in
a range of institutional settings (Bando et al., 2016; Cheng et al., 2018; Galiani et al., 2016;
Tseng and Petrie, 2014). Further study is needed to understand the association between
non-contributory pension and suicide prevention among financially distressed seniors.
[Insert Table A.1 about here]
[Insert Table A.2 about here]
[Insert Table A.3 about here]
[Insert Table A.4 about here]
15
References
Aguila, E., Kapteyn, A., and Smith, J. P. (2015). Effects of income supplementation on
health of the poor elderly: The case of Mexico. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, 112(1), 70–75.
Aguila, E., Lopez-Ortega, M., and Robledo, L. M. G. (2018). Non-contributory pension
programs and frailty of older adults: Evidence from Mexico. PLoS One, 13(11),
e0206792.
Bando, R., Galiani, S., and Gertler, P. (2016). The effects of non-contributory pensions on
material and subjective well being (NBER Working Paper No. w22995). Cambridge,
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Barrientos, A., and Lloyd-Sherlock, P. (2002). Non-contributory pensions and social protec-
tion. Geneva, Switzerland: International Labour Organization.
Case, A. (2004). Does money protect health status? Evidence from South African pensions.
In D. A. Wise (Ed.), Perspectives on the Economics of Aging (pp. 287–312). Chicago,
IL: University of Chicago Press.
Cheng, L., Liu, H., Zhang, Y., and Zhao, Z. (2018). The health implications of social
pensions: Evidence from China’s new rural pension scheme. Journal of Comparative
Economics, 46(1), 53–77.
Christensen, H., Mackinnon, A. J., Korten, A., and Jorm, A. F. (2001). The “common
cause hypothesis” of cognitive aging: Evidence for not only a common factor but also
specific associations of age with vision and grip strength in a cross-sectional analysis.
Psychology and Aging, 16(4), 588–599.
Deaton, A., and Case, A. (1998). Large cash transfers to the elderly in South Africa. The
Economic Journal, 108, 1330–1361.
Decker, S., and Schmitz, H. (2016). Health shocks and risk aversion. Journal of Health
Economics, 50, 156–170.
Dooley, D., and Prause, J. (2002). Mental health and welfare transitions: Depression and
alcohol abuse in AFDC women. American Journal of Community Psychology, 30(6),
787–813.
Engelhardt, G. V., and Gruber, J. (2011). Medicare Part D and the financial protection of
the elderly. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 3(4), 77–102.
Frederick, S., and Loewenstein, G. (1999). Hedonic adaptation. In D. E. Kahneman, E.
Diener, and N. Schwarz (Eds.), Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology
(pp. 302–329). New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
16
French, D. J., Browning, C., Kendig, H., Luszcz, M. A., Saito, Y., Sargent-Cox, K., and
Anstey, K. J. (2012). A simple measure with complex determinants: Investigation of
the correlates of self-rated health in older men and women from three continents. BMC
Public Health, 12(1), 649.
Galiani, S., Gertler, P., and Bando, R. (2016). Non-contributory pensions. Labour Eco-
nomics, 38, 47–58.
Gruber, J., and Yelowitz, A. (1999). Public health insurance and private savings. Journal
of Political Economy, 107(6), 1249–1274.
Hessel, P., Avendano, M., Rodr´ıguez-Castela´n, C., and Pfutze, T. (2018). Social pension
income associated with small improvements in self-reported health of poor older men
in Colombia. Health Affairs, 37(3), 456–463.
Hubbard, R. G., Skinner, J., and Zeldes, S. P. (1995). Precautionary saving and social
insurance. Journal of Political Economy, 103(2), 360–399.
Idler, E. L., and Benyamini, Y. (1997). Self-rated health and mortality: A review of twenty-
seven community studies. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 38(1), 21–37.
John, J. A., and Draper, N. R. (1980). An alternative family of transformations. Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society: Series C (Applied Statistics), 29(2), 190–197.
Jones, R.S., and Urasawa, S. (2014). Reducing the high rate of poverty among the elderly
in Korea (Economics Department Working Paper No. 1163). Paris, France: OECD
Publishing.
Kang, S. H., and Choi, O. K. (2010). The impact of the Basic Old-Age Pension scheme on
poverty reduction and income. Korea Social Policy Review, 17, 43–71.
Kaushal, N. (2014). How public pension affects elderly labor supply and well-being: Evi-
dence from India. World Development, 56, 214–225.
Koh, K., and Yang, H. (2017). Does a government public transfer program crowd out in-
tergenerational transfers? Evidence from South Korea. Paper presented at the Korean
Association of Public Finance.
Krause, N. (1996). Welfare participation and self-esteem in later life. The Gerontologist,
36(5), 665–673.
Kuhn, A. (2018). The complex effects of retirement on health. IZA World of Labor, 430.
Kwon, J. W., Chun, H., and Cho, S. I. (2009). A closer look at the increase in suicide rates
in South Korea from 1986–2005. BMC Public Health, 9, 72.
Lee, S., and Jang, H. (2015). Impact of basic senior pension on income and consumption:
The regression-discontinuity approach. Journal of Governance Studies, 10, 117–142.
17
Lee, S., Ku, I., and Shon, B. (2019). The effects of old-age public transfer on the well-
being of older adults: The case of social pension in South Korea. The Journals of
Gerontology: Series B, 74(3), 506–515.
Lee, C. J., and Kwon, H. J. (2016). Analysis of impacts of the basic pension: Focusing on
living expenses of the elderly. Korean Public Administration Quarterly, 28, 365–388.
Lee, J., and Lee, Y. (2009). Old-age income security and private transfers in South Korea.
Journal of Aging & Social Policy, 21(4), 393–407.
Lee, J. H., and Moon, S. (2014). The effects of basic pension on elderly consumption. Korean
Policy Studies Review, 23, 411–440.
Lee, H. S., and Wolf, D. A. (2014). An evaluation of recent old-age policy innovations in
South Korea. Research on Aging, 36(6), 707–730.
Lee, W., Hong, K., Lim, S. S., Kim, D. H., and Yoon, J. H. (2017). The association between
symptomatic and diagnostic depression and pain among the elderly population in South
Korea. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 205(9), 699–704.
Lloyd-Sherlock, P., and Agrawal, S. (2014). Pensions and the health of older people in South
Africa: Is there an effect?. The Journal of Development Studies, 50(11), 1570–1586.
Pak, T. Y. (2020a). Old-age income security and tourism demand: A quasi-experimental
study. Journal of Travel Research, 59(7), 1298–1315.
Pak, T. Y. (2020b). Social protection for happiness? The impact of social pension reform
on subjective well-being of the Korean elderly. Journal of Policy Modeling, 42(2), 349–
366.
Phelan, J. C., Link, B. G., and Tehranifar, P. (2010). Social conditions as fundamental
causes of health inequalities: Theory, evidence, and policy implications. Journal of
Health and Social Behavior, 51(1 Suppl.), S28–S40.
Powers, E. T. (1998). Does means-testing welfare discourage saving? Evidence from a
change in AFDC policy in the United States. Journal of Public Economics, 68(1),
33–53.
Qi, D., and Wu, Y. (2018). Does welfare stigma exist in China? Policy evaluation of the
Minimum Living Security System on recipients’ psychological health and wellbeing.
Social Science & Medicine, 205, 26–36.
Ruger, J. P., and Kim, H. J. (2007). Out-of-pocket healthcare spending by the poor and
chronically ill in the Republic of Korea. American Journal of Public Health, 97(5),
804–811.
18
Salinas-Rodr´ıguez, A., Torres-Pereda, M. D. P., Manrique-Espinoza, B., Moreno-Tamayo,
K., and Sol´ıs, M. M. T. R. (2014). Impact of the non-contributory social pension
program 70 y mas on older adults’ mental well-being. PLoS One, 9(11), e113085.
Shin, K. M., Cho, S. M., Hong, C. H., Park, K. S., Shin, Y. M., Lim, K. Y., et al. (2013).
Suicide among the elderly and associated factors in South Korea. Aging & Mental
Health, 17(1), 109–114.
Shin, E. H., and Do, Y. K. (2015). Basic old-age pension and financial wellbeing of older
adults in South Korea. Ageing and Society, 35(5), 1055–1074.
Silventoinen, K., Magnusson, P. K., Tynelius, P., Batty, G. D., and Rasmussen, F. (2009).
Association of body size and muscle strength with incidence of coronary heart disease
and cerebrovascular diseases: A population-based cohort study of one million Swedish
men. International Journal of Epidemiology, 38(1), 110–118.
Stuber, J., and Schlesinger, M. (2006). Sources of stigma for means-tested government
programs. Social Science & Medicine, 63(4), 933–945.
Syddall, H., Cooper, C., Martin, F., Briggs, R., and Aihie Sayer, A. (2003). Is grip strength
a useful single marker of frailty?. Age and Ageing, 32(6), 650–656.
Tseng, F. M., and Petrie, D. J. (2014). The implications for health, depression, and life sat-
isfaction from a permanent increase in income for the disadvantaged elderly: Evidence
from Taiwan. Review of Social Economy, 72(3), 311–336.
Turvey, C. L., Wallace, R. B., and Herzog, R. (1999). A revised CES-D measure of depres-
sive symptoms and a DSM-based measure of major depressive episodes in the elderly.
International Psychogeriatrics, 11(2), 139–148.
van Ginneken, W. (1999). Social security for the informal sector: A new challenge for the
developing countries. International Social Security Review, 52(1), 49–69.
19
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
1.5
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Coefficients 95% C.I.
(a) Interaction coefficients
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
1.5
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Treatment Control
(b) Treatment and control trendsGrip strength
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Coefficients 95% C.I.
(a) Interaction coefficients
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Treatment Control
(b) Treatment and control trendsSelf-rated health
-1.
5
-1
-.5
0
.5
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Coefficients 95% C.I.
(a) Interaction coefficients
-1.
5
-1
-.5
0
.5
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Treatment Control
(b) Treatment and control trendsCES-D score
Figure 1: Event Study Plot
20
Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics, KLoSA 2008-2016
Age (55-64 years) Age (65-74 years)
Pre Post Pre Post Full sample
Health outcomes
Grip strength 26.7 27.5 23.8 24.7 25.5
Self-rated health (1-5) 3.37 3.36 3.07 3.06 3.21
CES-D score (0-30) 5.68 5.10 6.79 5.78 5.93
Socioeconomic covariates
Age 57.0 59.5 64.4 67.7 61.9
Female (0,1) 0.55 0.57 0.65 0.64 0.60
Middle school graduate (0,1) 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20
High school graduate (0,1) 0.54 0.66 0.33 0.39 0.47
Married (0,1) 0.88 0.85 0.85 0.81 0.85
Separated or divorced (0,1) 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03
Widowed (0,1) 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.11
Number of children 2.30 2.15 2.88 2.67 2.52
National pension beneficiary (0,1) 0.11 0.13 0.26 0.34 0.21
Social welfare beneficiary (0,1) 0.02 0.02 0.15 0.05 0.07
Own public health insurance (0,1) 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.96
Own private health insurance (0,1) 0.54 0.64 0.29 0.34 0.44
Regular exercise (0,1) 0.44 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.42
Full-time employee (0,1) 0.55 0.57 0.33 0.32 0.44
Household income (thousand KRW)➜ 37,841 42,257 25,843 26,230 32,500
Total net worth (thousand KRW)➜ 279,712 190,959 267,028 168,633 237,787
Financial satisfaction (0-100) 57.5 59.9 54.7 57.0 56.9
Life satisfaction (0-100) 65.1 65.6 62.0 63.2 63.9
Observations 16,430
Persons 3792
Notes: Mean values are calculated using weights provided in the KLoSA. Minimum and maxi-
mum values are presented in parentheses. ➜All monetary figures are adjusted to 2016 KRW using
the Korean consumer price index and expressed in a thousand KRW.
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Table 2: Regressions for health outcomes
Outcome: Grip SR health CES-D
(1) (2) (3)
I(Age ≥ 65) 0.002 0.028 0.292**
(0.157) (0.021) (0.138)
Post 1.536*** 0.036 -0.065
(0.286) (0.042) (0.305)
I(Age ≥ 65) × Post 0.261 0.001 -0.500***
(0.196) (0.037) (0.182)
Age 0.153 -0.075*** 0.198
(0.140) (0.021) (0.157)
Age squared (/100) -0.292** 0.044** -0.128
(0.114) (0.017) (0.130)
Female -12.024*** -0.153*** 0.473***
(0.191) (0.024) (0.134)
Middle school grad. 0.408** 0.150*** -0.376**
(0.166) (0.028) (0.175)
High school grad. 0.671*** 0.260*** -0.750***
(0.182) (0.028) (0.166)
Married 2.184** 0.099 -1.071
(0.925) (0.112) (0.789)
Separated or divorced 2.609** 0.052 -0.179
(1.044) (0.122) (0.884)
Widowed 2.260** 0.174 -0.327
(0.936) (0.117) (0.803)
Number of children 0.037 -0.003 -0.048
(0.077) (0.009) (0.064)
National pension -0.114 -0.017 -0.119
(0.175) (0.022) (0.174)
Social welfare 0.165 -0.118*** -0.601**
(0.256) (0.030) (0.237)
Public health insurance 1.727*** 0.267*** -2.381***
(0.389) (0.054) (0.343)
Log(HH incsome) 0.491*** 0.122*** -0.405***
(0.064) (0.010) (0.075)
Log(net worth) 0.038** 0.008*** -0.014
(0.017) (0.002) (0.015)
Observations 16,430 16,430 16,430
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the indi-
vidual and age levels. Regressions control for cohort fixed effects, month-
of-survey fixed effects, and year-of-survey fixed effects. *** p < 0.01; **
p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
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Table 3: Regressions for health outcomes, with year fixed effects
Outcome: Grip SR health CES-D
(1) (2) (3)
I(Age ≥ 65) 0.166 0.041* 0.352**
(0.219) (0.022) (0.144)
Year 2008 -0.213 0.004 -0.564***
(0.224) (0.032) (0.179)
Year 2010 -0.943*** 0.002 0.256**
(0.206) (0.028) (0.128)
Year 2014 0.794*** 0.010 -0.310***
(0.168) (0.028) (0.108)
Year 2016 1.124*** 0.062* -0.472**
(0.245) (0.034) (0.210)
γ3,2008: I(Age ≥ 65) × Year 2008 -0.384 0.001 -0.132
(0.276) (0.036) (0.171)
γ3,2010: I(Age ≥ 65) × Year 2010 -0.136 -0.041 -0.053
(0.247) (0.037) (0.159)
γ3,2014: I(Age ≥ 65) × Year 2014 0.002 0.006 -0.333***
(0.247) (0.038) (0.128)
γ3,2016: I(Age ≥ 65) × Year 2016 0.275 -0.039 -0.831***
(0.265) (0.047) (0.228)
Observations 16,430 16,430 16,430
Joint significance test (p-value from Chi-square test):
H0: γ3,2008=γ3,2010=0 0.316 0.308 0.742
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual and
age levels. Regressions control for cohort fixed effects, month-of-survey fixed effects,
and year-of-survey fixed effects. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
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Table 4: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Grip 0.220 0.261 -0.172 -0.166 -0.091
(0.391) (0.196) (0.336) (0.324) (0.369)
SR health 0.002 0.001 0.013 0.010 0.016
(0.045) (0.037) (0.045) (0.044) (0.049)
CES-D -0.440*** -0.500*** -0.373** -0.366** -0.384**
(0.157) (0.182) (0.162) (0.164) (0.183)
Notes: Table presents estimates for an interaction between I(Age ≥ 65) and a
post-2014 dummy. Column (1) presents estimates from the null model that does
not control for any covariate. Column (2) shows estimates conditioned on the
baseline covariates. Column (3) includes a full set of covariates plus interactions
between I(Age ≥ 65) and linear time trend and quadratic age effect. Column (4)
includes all covariates in column (3) plus unemployment rate. Column (5) includes
all covariates in column (4) plus interactions between I(Age ≥ 65) and marital
status, national pension, social welfare, public health insurance, household income,
total net worth, and unemployment rate. Robust standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the individual and age levels. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
Table 5: Local average treatment effects
Outcome:
Public
transfer
income
Grip SR health CES-D
(1) (2) (3) (4)
I(Age ≥ 65) × Post 0.710***
(0.087)
Public transfer income -0.128 0.023 -0.542**
(0.487) (0.055) (0.258)
Underidentificationa 17.5 17.5 17.5
Weak instrumentsb 26.2 26.2 26.2
Observations 16,430 16,430 16,430 16,430
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual and
age levels. Regressions control for a full set of covariates, including interactions be-
tween I(Age ≥ 65) and covariates. aKleibergen-Paap rank LM statistic tests the
null hypothesis that the structural equation is underidentified (rank condition fails).
bKleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic tests the null hypothesis of weak instruments. ***
p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
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Table 6: Evaluating potential mechanisms, CES-D score as an outcome
Outcome: CES-D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A:
I(Age ≥ 65) × Post -0.500*** -0.526*** -0.474*** -0.496*** -0.366* -0.380**
(0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.189) (0.187)
Full-time employee X X
Regular exercise X X
Own private health insurance X X
Subjective well-being X X
Observations 16,430 16,430 16,430 16,430 16,428 16,428
Panel B:
I(Age ≥ 65) × Post -0.509*** -0.504*** -0.515*** -0.513*** -0.521*** -0.525***
(0.188) (0.187) (0.187) (0.187) (0.187) (0.185)
Full-time employee X X
Regular exercise X X
Own private health insurance X X
Subjective well-being X X
Observations 12,054 12,054 12,054 12,019 12,054 12,019
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual and age levels. Subjective
well-being includes financial satisfaction and life satisfaction, defined on a scale of 0-100. Regressions
control for a full set of covariates. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
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Table 7: Heterogeneous effects by characteristics of the respondent (in 2012)
Income Net worth Female Employed
Social
welfare
receipt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Low -0.544** -0.884***
(0.257) (0.336)
Observations 8839 7713
High -0.473** -0.250
(0.238) (0.240)
Observations 7591 8717
Yes -0.675** -0.252 0.627
(0.296) (0.306) (1.381)
Observations 10,514 6302 1474
No -0.085 -0.647** -0.579***
(0.396) (0.281) (0.192)
Observations 5916 10,128 14,956
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual and age
levels. Low values of household income are defined as household income in 2012 strictly
lower than the mean of household income in 2012. Low values of net worth represent net
worth in 2012 strictly lower than the median of net worth in 2012. Regressions control for
a full set of covariates. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
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Appendix A
Table A.1: Robustness of standard error estimates
Outcome: Grip SR health CES-D
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline estimates 0.261 0.001 -0.500***
Clustered at the household and age levels (0.196) (0.037) (0.182)
Clustered at the household levels (0.256) (0.033) (0.237)**
Clustered at the age levels (0.183) (0.035) (0.163)***
Clustered at the PSU levels (0.185) (0.029) (0.199)**
Clustered at the individual and PSU levels (0.188) (0.029) (0.204)**
Clustered at the individual and year levels (0.155)* (0.027) (0.230)**
Clustered at the household and age levels (0.212) (0.038) (0.211)**
Clustered at the household and PSU levels (0.188) (0.030) (0.207)**
Clustered at the household and year levels (0.158)* (0.027) (0.236)**
Notes: Table presents estimates for an interaction between I(Age ≥ 65) and a
post-2014 dummy. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions control for
a full set of covariates. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
Table A.2: Description of covariates
Variable Description
Full-time employee Respondent is paid-employee or self-employed.
Regular exercise Respondent does exercise at least once a week.
Private health insurance
Respondent owns private health insurance, not including life
insurance.
Financial satisfaction
Response on a range of 0-100 to “how happy are you with your
financial condition?”
Life satisfaction
Response on a range of 0-100 to “how satisfied are you with your
overall quality of life?”
Number of medical service use
Number of inpatient and outpatient care use, dental visit, and
oriental clinic visit since the last survey.
OOP medical expenditures
Out-of-pocket expenditures for inpatient and outpatient care,
dental care, oriental medical services, and prescription drugs
since the last survey.
Food expenditures
Monthly average spending on food-at-home and
food-away-from-home in the year prior to the survey.
Leisure expenditures
Monthly average spending on leisure trips (tour, journey, and
picnic), entertainment activities (attending arts, cultural, sports,
and other entertainment events), and recreational activities
(participation in hobby/recreation-related activities or programs)
over the last 12 months before the survey.
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Table A.3: Robustness of standard error estimates
Outcome: Financial satisfaction Life satisfaction
(1) (2)
I(Age ≥ 65) × Post 1.986*** 1.309*
(0.697) (0.680)
Observations 16,428 16,428
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
the individual and age levels. Regressions control for a full set of
covariates. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
Table A.4: Evaluating potential mechanisms, clinical depression as an outcome
Outcome: Clinical depression (CES-D ≥ 12)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A:
I(Age ≥ 65) × Post -0.030** -0.031*** -0.029** -0.030** -0.024* -0.024*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Full-time employee X X
Regular exercise X X
Own private health insurance X X
Subjective well-being X X
Observations 16,430 16,430 16,430 16,430 16,428 16,428
Panel B:
I(Age ≥ 65) × Post -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.040***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Full-time employee X X
Regular exercise X X
Own private health insurance X X
Subjective well-being X X
Observations 12,054 12,054 12,054 12,019 12,054 12,019
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual and age levels. Subjective
well-being includes financial satisfaction and life satisfaction, defined on a scale of 0-100. Regressions
control for a full set of covariates. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
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